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JURISDICTION 
This Court has statutory jurisdiction of this appeal pur-
suant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
where the notice of appeal was filed over thirteen months after 
the action was dismissed, and almost nine months after entry of 
an order denying a Rule 60 motion to set aside the dismissal. 
This Court reviews the record de novo on jurisdictional issues. 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. 
Anderson. 282 P.2d 845 (Utah 1955). 
2. Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in 
denying the Rule 60 motion for relief from the judgment. This 
Court will reverse that ruling only if it is clear that the trial 
court abused its broad discretion in ruling on relief from a 
judgment. Russell v. Martell. 681 P. 2d 1193, 1194-95 (Utah 
1984) . 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and 
order. In a case in which an appeal is per-
mitted as a matter of right from the trial 
court to the appellate court, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 3 0 
days after the date of entry of the judgment 
or order appealed from. * * * 
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Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mis-
takes in judgments, orders or other parts of 
the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such 
notice, if any, as the court orders. During 
the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may 
be so corrected before the appeal is docket-
ed in the appellate court, and thereafter 
while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable 
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other mis-
conduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not 
been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is 
no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall 
be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
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order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
* * * 
(2) If a certificate of readiness for 
trial has not been served and filed within 
180 days of the filing date and absent a 
showing of good cause, the court shall 
dismiss the case without prejudice for lack 
of prosecution. 
Rule 4-502, Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
(1) Parties conducting discovery under 
Rules 33, 34 and 3 6 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure shall not file discovery 
requests with the clerk of the court, but 
shall file only the original certificate of 
service stating that the discovery requests 
have been served on the other parties and 
the date of service. The responding party 
shall file a similar certificate with the 
clerk of the court. * * * 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion prac-
tice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commis-
sioners and the small claims department of 
the circuit court. * * * 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and 
memoranda• 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. 
All motions, except uncontested or ex-
parte matters, shall be accompanied by 
a memorandum of points and authorities, 
appropriate affidavits, and copies of 
or citations by page number to relevant 
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portions of depositions, exhibits or 
other documents relied upon in support 
of the motion. * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Phelps and Carlson ["plaintiffs"] filed this action on 
February 25, 1987, against Sears and nine individual Sears 
employees ["defendants"] alleging emotional distress, wrongful 
discharge, defamation, and racketeering arising out of plain-
tiffs' employment as sales persons at Sears and their termina-
tions on September 24, 1986. (R. 2-12). 
Over the next seven months, an Amended Complaint and Second 
Amended Complaint deleted three of the nine individual Sears 
employees and added two more state law counts arising from the 
terminations. (R. 125-155). 
Also, in November of 1987, plaintiffs sued Sears in United 
States District Court for the District of Utah alleging age and 
sex discrimination in violation of federal law, Civil No. 87-C-
1014S. Discovery was completed in that action on April 30, 1990. 
On August 16, 1990, Judge David Sam granted summary judgment for 
Sears on all claims, finding that plaintiffs were not harassed in 
the work place because of age or sex, and that plaintiffs' termi-
nations were not because of age or sex but because of plaintiffs' 
insubordination and willful disobedience of rules. Plaintiffs' 
appeal from the summary judgment is now pending before the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
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Because the federal action and the instant state action 
involve the same facts, plaintiffs and defendants agreed through 
counsel that discovery in either action could apply to the other 
action. However, defendants are unaware of any order from the 
Federal District Court that discovery in the federal case would 
be applicable to the state action as asserted in plaintiffs' 
brief, page 3. Further, no such agreement purported to relieve 
plaintiffs of their duty to prosecute the instant action in a 
timely manner or to inform the trial judge of the progress of 
discovery. 
The last indication in the record of pretrial discovery is 
defendants' certificate of service of responses to interrogator-
ies and requests for production of documents, dated May 4, 1990. 
(R. 212). 
On February 22, 1991, at a hearing on the court's own motion 
and order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute, the court ordered: 
Based on the motion of counsel for the 
plaintiff, the court orders the court's own 
order to show cause be continued 45 days for 
certification or be dismissed. (R. 218). 
No certification of readiness for trial was filed, nor did 
plaintiffs file any explanation for such failure, until after the 
action was dismissed. 
The next entry in the record is the court's order of 
dismissal of April 22, 1991, for failure to prosecute. (R. 219). 
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On March 6, 1991, plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the 
order of dismissal, asserting that Rule 60(a) allows relief from 
judgments or orders where clerical mistakes or other errors 
arising from oversight or omission are made, and asserting that 
Rule 60(b) provides for relief from a judgment or order in the 
event of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. 
[This language is from Rule 60(b)(1)]. (R. 221-226). 
In this motion, plaintiffs spent several pages explaining 
that they had not filed a certificate of readiness for trial 
within 45 days as ordered by the court at the hearing on order to 
show cause because they were awaiting discovery responses from 
defendants which were not yet due because plaintiffs delayed five 
full weeks after the order to show cause hearing before serving 
the discovery. After the hearing of February 22, 1991, in which 
the court allowed 45 days for plaintiffs to file certification or 
readiness for trial, or in the alternative face dismissal, plain-
tiffs delayed until March 29, 1991, before serving additional 
discovery on defendants. Plaintiffs7 explanation stated that a 
certificate of service of discovery was filed on March 29, 1991. 
No such certificate of service appears in the court record. 
Plaintiffs further stated that they were awaiting responses to 
this discovery when they received the court's order of dismissal. 
(R. 221-226). 
This motion was signed by counsel but was not in affidavit 
form and no affidavit was provided, although plaintiffs asserted 
facts in the motion which did not otherwise appear on the record. 
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Defendants objected to setting aside the dismissal, filed 
May 6, 1991. (R. 227-229). 
On September 5, 1991, four months later, plaintiffs filed a 
notice to submit for decision their motion to set aside the 
dismissal [mailed September 3, 1991]. (R. 232-233). 
The court denied the motion to set aside dismissal, citing 
the reasons specified in plaintiffs7 motion and in the objection 
thereto, and noting that the motion was insufficient as no 
supporting affidavit was submitted. (R. 234-236). 
Five months later, on February 25, 1992, plaintiffs filed a 
second motion to set aside the order of dismissal. The motion 
stated that it was based on Rule 60(b)(7). However, the 
accompanying affidavit and memorandum made the same arguments as 
in the first motion. (R. 237-251). 
Defendants filed an objection on March 2, 1992, pointing out 
that the second motion asserted the same factual grounds as the 
first motion, and separate successive motions on the same grounds 
should not be allowed; and that the motion actually stated a 
claim under Rule 60(b)(1), for which the three-month time for 
filing had expired. (R. 252-255). 
On May 13, 1992, the court denied the second motion to set 
aside order of dismissal, and entered an order on its decision on 
May 28, 1992. (R. 256, 259-260). 
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on June 24, 1992, from 
the order entered May 28, 1992, denying the second motion to set 
aside order of dismissal. (R. 261-262). 
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Plaintiffs never appealed from the order of dismissal itself 
or from the order denying their first motion to set aside order 
of dismissal. 
Objection to Plaintiffs7 Statement of the Case 
Plaintiffs assert that on March 29, 1991, interrogatories 
and requests for production of documents were served on defen-
dants, and a certificate of service was filed with the court, and 
that defendants' response was due April 28, 1991. In fact, no 
certificate of service of discovery was filed with the court, as 
the court record clearly shows. 
The discovery was served by mail on defendants on March 29, 
1991, and a certificate of service was served on defendants. 
However, no certificate was filed with the court as required by 
the Code of Judicial Administration. [The certificate of service 
from defendants' files is included in the addendum to this 
brief]. 
Since plaintiffs did not comply with the rule requiring 
filing of certificate of service of discovery with the court, the 
court had no way to know from the record that discovery was out-
standing when it dismissed the action on its own motion for 
failure to prosecute. 
Further, after apparently representing to the court at the 
hearing on February 22, 1991, that they could have their case 
ready for certification in 45 days, plaintiffs delayed 35 days, 
until March 29, to serve by mail discovery requests which under 
their own terms were not due for a response for another 3 3 days 
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(Rule 33(a) and Rule 34(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), a 
total of 68 days, which was 23 days or over three weeks beyond 
the extension of 45 days granted by the trial judge. 
Therefore, plaintiffs' assertion that the dismissal of the 
case was ordered six days prior to the deadline for response to 
the discovery requests is incorrect. The dismissal was entered 
April 22, 1991, and the discovery requests were due May 1, nine 
days later, but only because of plaintiffs' own delay in serving 
the requests. 
Disposition in Court Below 
The trial court, Hon. J. Dennis Frederick, dismissed this 
action on the court's own motion, for failure to prosecute on 
April 22, 1991, after plaintiffs failed to file a certification 
of readiness for trial after the action had been pending four 
years and two months, and after the court had ordered plaintiffs 
two months previously to file a certification of readiness for 
trial within 45 days or face dismissal. The court entered its 
order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal on 
October 1, 1991. The court entered its order denying a second 
motion by plaintiffs to set aside order of dismissal on May 28, 
1992. On June 24, 1992, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal, 
appealing only from the judgment of May 28, 1992, denying their 
second Rule 60 motion. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Defendants respectfully request this Court to enter its 
judgment and order that plaintiffs have deprived the court of 
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jurisdiction by failing to file timely appeal from the order of 
dismissal and from the order denying the first motion to set 
aside dismissal. 
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition and 
memorandum of points and authorities on this issue pursuant to 
Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Supreme 
Court denied that motion and deferred any ruling on the 
jurisdiction issue until plenary presentation and consideration 
of the case. (Order of October 28, 1992) . See Isaacson v. 
Dorius, 669 P.2d 849, 850 (Utah 1983). 
Alternatively, defendants request the Court to affirm the 
trial court's order denying plaintiffs' second motion to set 
aside order of dismissal, which was the only order appealed from. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. There is no jurisdiction for this appeal because 
the notice of appeal was filed nine months after the order 
denying the first Rule 60 motion. A second successive Rule 60(b) 
motion cannot be used to create an appeal. The order of October 
1, 1991, denying the first Rule 60(b) motion was a final appeal-
able order. Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the time for appeal by 
filing a second successive motion because the second motion was 
barred by the law of the case. 
Both motions were in substance Rule 60(b)(1) motions based 
on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, despite 
plaintiffs7 attempt to title the second motion as a Rule 60(b)(7) 
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motion. The substance of pleadings prevails over any inconsis-
tent title or label assigned to them. 
POINT II. The appeal from the denial of plaintiffs' second 
Rule 60 motion should be denied because that motion was barred by 
plaintiffs' failure to file it within three months after the 
order of dismissal was entered. The second motion was filed 
February 18, 1992, almost ten months after the order of 
dismissal. Its substance was a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Therefore, 
the second motion was filed beyond the three-month limit provided 
in Rule 60(b). 
POINT III. Even if the second motion could be characterized 
properly as a Rule 60(b)(7) motion, the court acted within its 
broad discretion in concluding that it was not filed within a 
reasonable time as required by the rule. 
POINT IV. This court is without jurisdiction over any 
appeal from the dismissal of the action itself because there was 
no timely appeal from the order of dismissal. The action was 
dismissed on April 22, 1991. Appellants filed a motion on May 3, 
1991, which appellants now characterize as a Rule 60(a) motion. 
(Brief of Appellants, p. 4). However, motions under Rule 60(a) 
do not suspend the time for appeal from the original order of 
dismissal. 
Further, the May 1991 motion was in fact a Rule 60(b) motion 
in form and substance. Rule 60(b) expressly provides that a 
motion under that subdivision does not affect the finality of a 
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judgment. Consequently, the time for appeal from the order of 
dismissal expired May 22, 1991. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to use Rule 60 motions as a 
substitute for appeal, in an attempt to circumvent the result of 
their failure to file a timely appeal from the order of 
dismissal. The thrust of both of plaintiffs' Rule 60 motions was 
that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the 
action. Alleged judicial error is a subject which should have 
been addressed in a direct appeal from the order of dismissal, 
and not through a Rule 60 motion. Appeal from denial of a Rule 
60 motion brings up for review only the correctness of the order 
denying the Rule 60 motion, and does not bring up for review the 
judgment from which relief is sought. 
POINT V. The court acted within the range of its broad 
discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute and 
in denying plaintiffs' motions for relief from the dismissal. 
Plaintiffs had delayed four years and two months without filing 
a certificate of readiness for trial. There was no certificate 
of service of any discovery in the court record for over a year 
before dismissal. At the order to show cause hearing on February 
22, 1991, they promised the court they would file a certificate 
of readiness for trial within 45 days or face dismissal. They 
filed no certificate of readiness for trial at all, and after two 
months, the court dismissed their action. 
Subsequently, on their first Rule 60 motion, plaintiffs 
asserted incorrectly that a certificate of service of discovery 
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had been filed in the court record. They declined to make that 
assertion under oath. Further, they offered no explanation for 
why they delayed 35 days after the hearing before filing 
discovery requests, when they knew that by doing so, there was no 
way the discovery could be answered within the 45-day limit to 
which plaintiffs had agreed at the order to show cause hearing. 
The court was entitled to conclude that plaintiffs' neglect was 
serious and purposeful, and not excusable under the requirements 
of Rule 60(b)(1). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THERE IS NO JURISDICTION FOR THIS APPEAL 
BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED NINE 
MONTHS AFTER THE ORDER DENYING THE FIRST 
RULE 60 MOTION, WHICH WAS A FINAL APPEALABLE 
ORDER. 
Plaintiffs appeal from the court's order of May 28, 1992, 
denying their second Rule 60 motion. However, eight months 
before this order, the court had entered its order denying 
plaintiffs' first Rule 60 motion, on October 1, 1991. That order 
was a final appealable order. Plaintiffs7 failure to file timely 
notice of appeal from the October 1, 1991 order is 
jurisdictional. 
This issue is controlled by the opinion in Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 968-70 (Utah App. 1989). In that 
case, Schettler filed a Rule 60 motion which was denied, and no 
appeal was taken. Schettler filed a second motion, asserting 
generally the same grounds for post-trial relief. The second 
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motion was denied, and Schettler appealed from the denial of the 
second motion. The court held that the order denying the first 
motion was a final appealable order, and since Schettler had not 
timely appealed that order, his appeal from the order denying the 
second motion did not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals. 
The opinion noted that the additional information included 
in the second Rule 60 motion was available to Schettler at the 
time he filed his first motion and with due diligence could have 
been included in the original motion. The court disapproved of 
successive post-judgment motions. 
The opinion restated well-settled Utah law that an order 
denying relief under Rule 60(b) is a final appealable order. 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987). The opinion 
concluded that the time for filing a notice of appeal on the 
first Rule 60(b) motion continued to run from the order denying 
that motion. Consequently, the Court could not take jurisdiction 
over an appeal which was not timely brought before it. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Schettler's appeal. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs7 first motion to set aside 
order of dismissal recites that it is based upon Rule 60(b) . (R. 
221). On the next page, the motion states: 
Rule 60(a) allows relief from judgments or 
orders where clerical mistakes or other 
errors arising from oversight or omission 
are made. In addition, Rule 60(b) provides 
for relief from a judgment or order in the 
event of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect. Based upon the following 
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discussion, the order of dismissal in this 
case should be set aside. 
(R. 222). The motion then continues to attempt to explain 
plaintiffs7 neglect in allowing the case to remain in discovery 
over four years, and in overlooking or ignoring the court's 
deadline for filing a certificate of readiness for trial. These 
are matters expressly within the scope of Rule 60(b)(1). That 
motion was denied by order of October 1, 1991, and no appeal was 
taken. 
On February 18, 1992, plaintiffs filed a second motion, 
together with an affidavit and memorandum. The second motion 
recited that it was based upon Rule 60(b)(7). (R. 237). 
However, the factual presentation and argument for relief in the 
affidavit and memorandum are essentially the same as those urged 
in the first motion. The memorandum in support of the second 
motion even goes so far as to allege the same identical grounds 
for relief as those asserted in the first motion: "In addition, 
Rule 60(b) provides for relief from a judgment or order in the 
event of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." 
(R. 240). These are the grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1), 
which were the grounds for the first motion. 
Most importantly, the substance and content of the two 
motions is essentially the same. The second motion is nothing 
more than an attempt to re-argue matters already settled by the 
court when it denied the first motion. 
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In an attempt to avoid dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, 
plaintiffs have attempted to label their second motion as a Rule 
60(b)(7) motion. However, where the nature of the second motion 
is essentially the same as the first motion, appeal will not be 
allowed where the time for appeal from denial of the first motion 
has expired. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d at 968-
970. 
The nature of a motion ascertained from the substance of the 
instrument will control the court's treatment of the motion over 
any inconsistent caption or title. Darrinaton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 
452, 457 (Utah App. 1991) (Materials filed in opposition to 
default judgment would be treated as Rule 60(b) motion to set 
aside default judgment, although not titled as such); Watkiss & 
Campbell v. Foa and Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Utah 1991) 
(Motion for reconsideration filed after summary judgment treated 
as Rule 59 motion for new trial); Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 
816 (Utah 1990) (Motion for relief from judgment treated as Rule 
59 motion); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian. 657 P.2d 1346, 1347-
48 (Utah 1983) (Motion for re-hearing treated as motion under 
Rule 52 or Rule 59); Howard v. Howard. 356 P.2d 275, 276-77 (Utah 
1960) ("Notice of intention to move for new trial" treated as 
motion for new trial where the document met the basic requirement 
of advising the opponent and the court of the issues raised). 
Subparagraph (7) may not be resorted to for relief when the 
ground asserted for relief falls within subparagraph (1). 
Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984) (Delay is a 
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60(b)(1) issue, in spite of movant's attempt to characterize it 
as 60(b)(7); Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 
429 (Utah 1982); Calder Bros. Co, v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926-
27 (Utah 1982); Pitts v. McLachlan. 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977). 
The above cases also stand for the rule that unexplained 
delays by counsel are Rule 60(b)(1) matters. In this case, 
plaintiffs' explanation in both of the Rule 60 motions was that 
(1) discovery in this case was neglected or delayed because 
discovery was proceeding in the federal action; (2) the discovery 
requests served on March 29, 1991, were not due for response by 
the 45-day deadline plaintiffs had agreed to because plaintiffs 
delayed in filing the discovery requests; and (3) the court 
should have known that there was outstanding discovery because 
plaintiffs filed a certificate of service, when in fact no such 
certificate was filed, apparently through mistake, inadvertence, 
or neglect. 
These explanations are precisely the reasons specified in 
subparagraph (1) : "Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect." No timely appeal was filed from the denial of the 
first Rule 60(b)(1) motion. 
Although plaintiffs attempt on appeal to characterize their 
first Rule 60 motion as a motion to correct clerical mistake 
under Rule 60(a), the substance of the motion itself and Utah 
case law decisions show that the motion was made under Rule 
60(b)(1) governing mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect. 
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In Richards v. Siddowav. 471 P.2d 143 (Utah 1970) , the court 
held that there was no clerical error where the substance of the 
judgment of the trial court did not follow the stipulated 
agreement of the parties• The court observed: 
The distinction between a judicial error and 
clerical error does not depend upon who made 
it. Rather, it depends on whether it was 
made in rendering the judgment or in record-
ing the judgment as rendered. 46 Am.Jur.2d 
Judgments, § 202. 
471 P.2d at 145. 
When this standard is applied to the instant case, it is 
clear that plaintiffs7 dispute is with the decision to render the 
judgment, which was not a clerical function at all. There is no 
dispute that the order of dismissal in fact was recorded by the 
clerk in the same form in which it was rendered by the trial 
judge. Variance in this aspect would create clerical error, but 
that did not occur in this case. 
In Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984), the court 
held that there was no clerical error when the trial judge signed 
and entered an order of dismissal with prejudice, which one of 
the parties later claimed should more properly have been entered 
without prejudice. The opinion quoted the same language quoted 
above from Richards v. Siddowav, and noted further that 
correction for clerical error is limited to the purpose of 
reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties. The 
court noted that Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of 
a substantial nature, particularly where the claim of error is 
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unilateral. The order of dismissal in the instant case does not 
contain any proper ground for relief because of clerical mistake. 
More important, the substance of plaintiffs' first Rule 60 motion 
does not involve any argument for the kind of relief which could 
be awarded because of clerical mistake in a proper case. 
Plaintiffs' first Rule 60 motion was exclusively or in 
substantial part a Rule 60(b) motion. It was denied and no 
timely appeal was filed from the denial. 
POINT II, 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' 
SECOND RULE 60 MOTION BECAUSE IT WAS NOT 
BROUGHT WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL WAS ENTERED. 
The second Rule 60 motion was in substance a Rule 60(b)(1) 
motion, required by the rule to be filed not more than three 
months after the judgment or order was entered. 
The order of dismissal was entered February 22, 1991. The 
second motion was filed February 18, 1992, almost 10 months after 
the order of dismissal. Therefore, the second motion was filed 
beyond the three-month limit provided in Rule 60(b), and the 
trial court was correct in denying the motion on that ground. 
Utah law is clear that parties may not avoid the three-month 
limitation imposed on relief under subparagraph (1) by 
characterizing the post-trial motion under subparagraph (7) . 
Further, unexplained delays by counsel of the sort engaged in by 
plaintiffs in this case are Rule 60(b)(1) matters for which the 
motion must be filed within three months after the judgment or 
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order. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984); Gardiner 
and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982); Calder 
Bros. Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982); Pitts v. 
McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977). 
Plaintiffs cannot avoid the three-month time limit 
requirement by characterizing their second motion as a Rule 
60(b)(7) motion. Their second motion was filed beyond the time 
limit established in Rule 60, and the trial court properly denied 
it for that reason. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IP THE SECOND MOTION COULD BE 
CHARACTERIZED PROPERLY AS A RULE 60(b)(7) 
MOTION, THE COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS BROAD 
DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WAS NOT 
FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AS REQUIRED 
BY THE RULE. 
Rule 60 requires that motions under subparagraph (7) for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment" must be made "within a reasonable time." 
In this case, the second Rule 60 motion was filed almost 10 
months after the order of dismissal. The second motion stated 
essentially the same grounds which were asserted in the first 
motion, filed 11 days after the order of dismissal. This shows 
that all facts known and available to plaintiffs to argue in 
support of their second motion were equally known and available 
at the time they filed their first motion. There was no 
justification for the delay in filing the second motion. Also, 
the affidavit in support of the second motion does not offer any 
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explanation or justification for the delay in filing the second 
motion. (R. 247-250). 
Plaintiffs seek to excuse their delay in filing the second 
motion by asserting that five months of the delay were consumed 
by the trial court's own delay in ruling on the first Rule 60 
motion. (Brief of Appellants, p. 7, 13). However, plaintiffs 
neglect to mention that it was plaintiffs themselves who failed 
to file a notice to submit their motion for decision during that 
time. Plaintiffs filed their first motion on May 3, 1991, and 
neglected to file a notice to submit for decision until September 
5, 1991. The court decided the motion the next day by minute 
entry on September 6, 1991. Under those circumstances, it hardly 
seems fair for plaintiffs to blame the court for the delay. 
Further, if plaintiffs' second motion was based on separate 
grounds from their first motion, as they assert, then they had no 
reason to await decision on the first motion before filing for 
relief on separate grounds in the second motion. 
The trial court was entitled to find within its broad 




THERE IS NO JURISDICTION OVER ANY APPEAL 
FROM A DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION ITSELF 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO TIMELY APPEAL FROM THE 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL. THE ONLY PURPORTED 
APPEAL IS FROM THE ORDER DENYING THE SECOND 
RULE 60 MOTION. 
Plaintiffs assert and argue in their brief that the district 
court's dismissal of this action was an abuse of discretion. The 
order of dismissal itself is not appealable because the time for 
appeal from the order has expired. 
If this Court reaches the merits of plaintiffs' claim that 
the denial of their second Rule 60 motion was an abuse of 
discretion, this Court should differentiate cautiously the 
grounds for a claim of abuse of discretion with respect to the 
Rule 60 motion, as opposed to the grounds for the order of 
dismissal itself. 
Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal. Anderson v. 
Anderson, 282 P.2d 845, 847 (Utah 1955). In particular, relief 
under the residual clause of Rule 60(b)(7) [identical to 60(b)(6) 
in the Federal Rules] is unavailable where a party could have 
filed an appeal and chose not to do so. 7 J. Moore and J. Lucas, 
Moore's Federal Practice & Procedure, pp. 141-142, 269 (2d ed. 
1992); 11 Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice & Procedure, pp. 214-215 (1973; 1992 Annot.); see 
Ackermann v. United States. 340 U.S. 193 (1950); Goodwin v. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp.. 806 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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Judicial error may not be asserted as a ground for relief 
under Rule 60(b) , at least after the time for appeal has run. 
7 J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moored Federal Practice & Procedure, p. 
330 (2d ed. 1992); Wagner v. United States. 316 F.2d 871 (2nd 
Cir. 1963), 
Rule 60(a) motions to correct clerical errors do not suspend 
the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. United 
States v. 1431.80 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Cross County, 
Ark. , 466 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1972); Moored Federal Practice, 2d 
ed., Vol. 6A, p. 60-56 (1992). 
If this court reaches the merits of the trial courts denial 
of plaintiffs' second Rule 60 motion, this Court should evaluate 
that decision based on the broad discretion of the trial court 
with respect to the motion itself, based on the circumstances 
before the court at the time of the motion. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ACTED WITHIN THE RANGE OP ITS 
BROAD DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE ACTION 
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM THE 
DISMISSAL. 
There was a substantial record to support the trial judge's 
dismissal of the action without prejudice for failure to 
prosecute. 
Plaintiffs filed their action on February 25, 1987. 
Rule 4-103(2) provides: 
If a certificate of readiness for trial 
has not been served and filed within 180 
days of the filing date absence a showing of 
23 
good cause, the court shall dismiss the case 
without prejudice for lack of prosecution. 
This rule merely codifies the inherent power of the trial 
court to dismiss a case on the court's own motion for lack of 
prosecution under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, Debt. of 
Agriculture. 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the instant case, no certificate of readiness for trial 
had been served or filed at the time of the dismissal order, 
which was four years and two months after the action was filed. 
The trial court was certainly within its discretion in determin-
ing that dismissal for failure to prosecute was indicated based 
solely on the length of time the action had been pending in the 
discovery stage. The intent of Rule 4-103 is stated in the rule 
itself: "To reduce the time between case filing and disposi-
tion." If trial judges are expected to enforce this rule to 
comply with the intent of the rule, they must be allowed the 
discretion to enforce the rule in egregious cases such as this 
one. 
Our courts have consistently upheld the reasonable discre-
tion of the judge to dismiss actions for failure to prosecute. 
Meadow Fresh Farms Inc. v. Utah State Univ. , 813 P. 2d 1216 (Utah 
App. 1991) (Timely Rule 60(b) motion to set aside dismissal was 
properly denied in view of plaintiff's delays); Maxfield v. 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App.), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 
1989) (Delay similar to the instant case held to justify 
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dismissal for failure to prosecute); Charlie Brown Constr. Co, 
Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc. , 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987) 
(Numerous delays justified dismissal for failure to prosecute on 
the trial court's own motion). 
The trial court was entitled to conclude that plaintiffs' 
excuses failed to establish good cause why the action should not 
be dismissed. Instead of dismissing the action at the first 
order to show cause hearing on February 22, 1991, the court 
granted plaintiffs' request to continue the hearing 45 days for 
certification or in the alternative the action would be 
dismissed. (Minute Entry of February 22, 1991, R. 218). After 
45 days, plaintiffs still had not filed a certification of 
readiness for trial. At that point, the trial court was entitled 
to conclude that since plaintiffs themselves had moved for a 
continuance of 45 days for certification or dismissal, and since 
plaintiffs did not file the certification, the only reasonable 
conclusion was that the alternative of dismissal should apply. 
This is especially true since plaintiffs themselves apparently 
moved for the 45-day continuance on those terms or at least 
acquiesced in the terms. Up to the time of the dismissal, 
plaintiffs filed no affidavit or memorandum explaining why they 
had not complied with the requirement to file certification of 
readiness for trial within 45 days after the hearing of February 
22, 1991, or face dismissal. The trial judge had nothing in 
front of him to indicate that plaintiffs had any ground for 
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opposing dismissal, or for that matter, that plaintiffs even 
intended to oppose dismissal at that point. 
Much later, defendants' counsel filed an affidavit dated 
February 18, 1992, in which he stated that he served plaintiffs' 
first set of interrogatories and request for production of 
documents to defendants on March 29, 1991, and filed a 
certificate of service on the same date. He argues that this 
outstanding discovery amounted to good cause why the action 
should not have been dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
However, the court record does not contain any certificate of 
service or other evidence of plaintiffs filing such discovery 
requests. On that basis, there was no way the trial judge could 
have had notice or knowledge of plaintiffs' belated discovery 
attempts at the time the judge dismissed the action for failure 
to prosecute. A review of the court records shows that the last 
written discovery requests filed by plaintiffs were request for 
production of documents dated March 16, 1989, almost two years 
earlier. (R. 183-184). 
Rule 4-502(1), Code of Judicial Administration, provides 
that parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34, and 3 6 
shall file in the court record the original certificate of 
service stating that the discovery requests have been served on 
the other parties and the date of service. Since plaintiffs did 
not file any such certificate of service, the trial judge was 
deprived of notice of the discovery requests which the procedure 
for filing certificates of service is designed to afford. 
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Consequently, the only reasonable conclusion by the trial judge 
was that no discovery had been filed. Plaintiffs' argument that 
the pending discovery requests amounted to good cause why the 
action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, rings 
hollow in the face of plaintiffs' own failure to file the 
required certificate of service to place the trial judge on 
notice of the discovery. 
Plaintiffs did in fact serve interrogatories and requests 
for production of documents to defendants by mail on March 29, 
1991, as plaintiffs' attorney asserted in his affidavit. 
However, the point is that the trial judge had no way of knowing 
this because plaintiffs did not file in the court record the 
certificate of service or any other notice that the discovery 
requests had been served on counsel. 
Even if the trial judge had been notified by plaintiffs that 
they had served discovery requests on March 29, 1991, the trial 
judge would have been entitled to conclude that this fact did not 
constitute good cause why the action should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. The affidavit of plaintiffs' attorney 
confirms that at the hearing on February 22, 1991, he represented 
to the court that he believed he could have the case ready for 
certification in 45 days. Then by his own admission he delayed 
35 days until March 29, to serve by mail discovery requests which 
under their own terms were not due for a response for another 33 
days (Rule 33(a) and Rule 34(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), 
a total of 68 days, which was 23 days or over three weeks beyond 
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the extension of 45 days granted by the trial judge at the 
hearing of February 22 and apparently agreed to by plaintiffs' 
counsel at that hearing. Plaintiffs have offered no explanation 
of why they delayed 35 days after the hearing before initiating 
the discovery requests, or why they failed to inform the trial 
judge of the circumstances at any time before the case was 
dismissed. 
These delays may not seem excessive in themselves, but when 
added to the totality of the circumstances, they show that the 
trial court acted within the scope of his discretion when he 
dismissed. The action had been pending in discovery for four 
years and two months, and plaintiffs themselves had failed to 
comply with the requirement that they file a certificate of 
readiness of trial within 45 days after the February 22 hearing 
or face dismissal for failure to prosecute. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have deprived this Court of jurisdiction over 
their Rule 60 motions by their failure to file timely appeal from 
the order of October 1, 1991, denying the motion to set aside 
dismissal. 
The order denying the motion to set aside dismissal from 
which this appeal was taken was within the broad range of 
discretion afforded to the trial court under the circumstances. 
This Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of 
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed, first class postage prepaid, this °[ 
day of 4t± 1993. 
L. Zane Gill 
Law Office of L. Zane Gill, P.C. 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Order to Show Cause (February 5, 1991) (R. 216-17). 
B. Minute Entry (February 22, 1991) (R. 218). 
C. Certificate of Service of Plaintiff's First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Defendants 
(March 29, 1991) (from defendants' file. 
Not filed or found in court record). 
D. Order of Dismissal (April 22, 1991) (R. 219-20). 
E. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal (dated May 3, 1991; filed 
May 6, 1991) (R. 221-26). 
F. Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's Motion 
To Set Aside Order of Dismissal (dated 
May 6, 1991; filed May 8, 1991) (R. 227-29). 
G. Notice to Submit for Decision, (dated 
September 3, 1991; filed September 5, 1991) (R. 232-33). 
H. Minute Entry (September 6, 1991) (R. 234). 
I. Order Denying Motion to Set Aside 
Dismissal (October 1, 1991) (R. 235-36). 
J. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal (dated February 18, 1992; filed 
February 25, 1992) (R. 237-38). 
K. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal (R. 239-46). 
L. Affidavit of L. Zane Gill (R. 247-51), 
M. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal (March 2, 1992) (R. 252-55) 
N. Minute Entry (May 13, 1992) (R. 256). 
0. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Set 
Aside Order of Dismissal (May 28, 1992) (R. 259-60) 
P. Notice of Appeal (dated June 22, 1992; 
filed June 24, 1992) (R. 261-62) 
A. Order to Show Cause 
(February 5, 1991) 
(R. 216-17) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHELPS ARLENE P., et al. 
Plaintiff(s). 
VS. 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al. 
Defendant(s). 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE NO. 
CIVIL NO. 870901394 CV 
HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
On it's own motion, the Court orders the parties in this 
case appear before the Court on: Friday, 02/22/91 at 08:30 AM, 
and show cause why this case should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. 
Failure to appear will be considered aquiescence in entry 
of an order of dismissal without further notice. 
Dated this 5th day of Februagsgr, 1992 
I certify that on <Q^/ ^ /c\\f 1 mailed a copy of the 
order to show cause to: 




A T T A C H M E N T 
GILL, L. ZANE 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
BRYANT, DAVID F 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
BULLOCK, ROGER H. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
6TH FLOOR BOSTON BUILDIN 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
0217 
B. Minute Entry 
(February 22, 1991) 
(R. 218) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHELPS ARLENE P. 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO. 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 870901394 CV 
DATE 02/22/91 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
TYPE OF HEARING; 
PRESENT: 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
P. ATTY. GILL, J.. ZANE 
D. ATTY. 
BASED ON THE MOTION OF COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF, THE COURT 
ORDERS THE COURT'S OWN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE BE CONTINUED 45 DAYS 
FOR CERTIFICATION OR BE DISMISSED. 
0218 
C. Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Defendants 
(March 29, 1991) (from defendants' file. 
Not filed or found in court record). 
>/f^/ 
L. Zane Gill (3716) 
David F. Bryant (5672) 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-1046 
FAX: (801)364-2511 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., a New 
York Corporation; JAMES FARNER; 
DENNIS MORSE; BLAINE TAYLOR; 
DIANE BOYD; RICHARD CONNELL; 
THEODORE PIPER; DAN NELSON; 
ROBERT PARK and GENE KOFORD, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET 
OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. C87-1394 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-named attorney for Plaintiffs, L. ZANE GILL 
of L. ZANE GILL, P.C, hereby certifies that on the date signed 
below, he caused to be served upon Defendants' counsel, Roger 
Bullock and Victoria Kidman of STRONG & HANNI, at Sixth Floor 
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANTS. 
DATED this (S ' day of March, 1991. 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
L.vZan£ Gill 
David/F. Bryant 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I hereby certify that on the ^/ day of March, 1991, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, irTthe U.S. Mails an 
original copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
DEFENDANTS to the following: 
Roger H. Bullock 
Victoria K. Kidman 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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D. Order of Dismissal 
(April 22, 1991) 
(R. 219-20) 
APR 2 2 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTfr.L^. V^ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHELPS ARLENE P., et al. 
Plaintiff(s) 
VS. 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al. 
Defendant(s) 
VuiyCte* 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CIVIL NO. 870901394 CV 
HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
The Court having ordered the parties in this case appear 
on February 22, 1991 and show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute, and the parties having 
failed to appear, IT IS ORDERED, that this case is dismissed 
without prejudice. 
Dated this 22nd day of April, 1991. 
BY THH COURT 
m&$ 
RICT 5GE, 
I certify that on )-] /3f3/£{[r I mailed a copy of the 
order of dismissal to: 




A T T A C H M E N T 
GILL, L. ZANE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
BULLOCK, ROGER H. 
Attorney for Defendant 
6TH FLOOR BOSTON BUILDIN 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
BRYANT, DAVID F 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
0220 
E. Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal (dated May 3, 1991; 
filed May 6, 1991) 
(R. 221-26) 
0 L. Zane Gill (3716) 
N Law Office of 
^ L. ZANE GILL 
A Utah Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-2600 
FAX:"(801) 355-2606 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and 
RONALD L. CARLSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al, ] 
Defendants. 
i PLAINTIFFS' MOTION | TO SET ASIDE ORDER | OF DISMISSAL 
) Civil No. C87-1394 
1 Judge Frederick 
The plaintiffs move the court through their counsel for 
an order setting aside the order of dismissal signed by the court 
on April 22, 1991. This motion is made based upon Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 4-103 of the Code of Judicial Administration -
Operation of the Courts - allows the court as a function of its 
civil calendar management to dismiss a case without prejudice for 
lack of prosecution if a certificate of readiness has not been 
served and filed within 180 days of the commencement of the action. 
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This authority is subject to a defense of good cause. In addition, 
Rule 4-104(4)(5) restricts a party from filing a certificate of 
readiness for trial in cases in which discovery is not complete 
prior to filing the certificate. 
Rule 60(a) allows relief from judgments or orders where 
clerical mistakes or other errors arising from oversight or 
omission are made. In addition, Rule 60(b) provides for relief 
from a judgment or order in the event of mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect. Based upon the following 
discussion, the order of dismissal in this case should be set 
aside. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case is closely related to a parallel federal action 
with the same heading which is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. This action states causes of action for state 
common law claims related to the wrongful termination of the 
plaintiffs from their employment at Sears Roebuck & Company in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Very little was done under this state action 
while the federal action was being litigated. Orders in the 
federal court allowed depositions taken in either action to be used 
in the federal case. The parallel federal case was aggressively 
litigated and prepared for trial. The Honorable Judge Sam granted 
2 
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the defendants' motions for summary judgment leading the plaintiffs 
to appeal that decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals where 
it is now pending. 
On October 5, 1990, counsel for the plaintiffs moved the 
court for a scheduling and management conference, pursuant to Rule 
16(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. At that time, counsel 
requested a scheduling and management conference in order to set 
time lines for the completion of any outstanding discovery, the 
filing and hearing of motions, the possibility of facilitating a 
settlement, and for such other matters as may aid in the 
disposition of the case. By minute entry dated October 11, 1990, 
the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a scheduling and 
management conference. The court indicated that pertinent dates 
would be set upon receipt of a certification of readiness for 
trial. 
Counsel for the plaintiff focused upon preparation of the 
briefing in the Tenth Circuit Appeal and no further discovery was 
conducted until after receiving an order to show cause in this 
action dated February 5, 1991. At the hearing held on February 22, 
1991<r counsel for plaintiffs represented to the court that he 
believed he could have the case ready for certification in 45 days 
in the event no further discovery was necessary. In reviewing the 
files, pursuant to that representation, counsel for the plaintiffs 
3 
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noticed that several items of discovery which had previously been 
requested in the federal action and which were pertinent to the 
issues in the state action had not been provided by the defendants. 
Accordingly, counsel for plaintiffs prepared and served plaintiffs' 
first set of interrogatories and request for production of 
documents to the defendants to cover unanswered requests from the 
federal case and certain new items pertinent to the preparation for 
trial in this matter. Those discovery requests were served on the 
defendants on March 29, 1991. A certificate of service was filed 
on the same date. 
By the date of receipt of the order of dismissal, April 
26r 1991, plaintiffs had heard no response from the defendants one 
way or the other. The order of dismissal was received six days 
before the expiration of the response time on the plaintiffs' first 
set of interrogatories and request for production of documents to 
the defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 4-104(5) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
provides that any certificate of readiness for trial in a case in 
which the discovery is not complete prior to filing the certificate 
may be stricken. Recognizing this fact and the fact that certain 
"loose ends" needed to be tied down before the case was ready for 
4 
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certification for trialf plaintiffs' counsel timely served upon 
defendants discovery intended to bring the case to completion for 
trial. The case is ready for trial other than these loose ends 
which are pending resolution. There have been numerous depositions 
taken which will be used in the state court action. There are 
boxes of documents that are pertinent to the state court litigation 
which were developed for use in both the federal and state cases 
and other than obtaining responses to the now outstanding discovery 
requests of the plaintiffs, the case is ready for assignment of a 
trial date. 
Therefore, good cause exists, under Rule 4-103, to 
prevent the involuntary dismissal without prejudice of this action 
for lack of prosecution. Plaintiffs' counsel substantially 
complied with the order of the court, pursuant to the order to show 
cause dated February 5, 1991, took affirmative steps to finally 
prepare the case for trial. 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully move 
the court to set aside its order of dismissal without prejudice and 
allow the case to be set for trial after any outstanding discovery 
objections are filed by defendants and resolved and/or defendants 
have provided the information requested by the plaintiffs in the 
discovery requests of March 29, 1991. 
5 
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DATED this 3/^ ^2: 
^ day of Agra: 1991. 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
L. Zane dill 
J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the £T day 
of May 1991 I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to: 
Roger H. Bullock 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8^ 4111 
D15:phelpsst.dis 
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F. Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Motion 
To Set Aside Order of Dismissal (dated 
May 6, 1991; filed May 8, 1991) 
(R. 227-29) 
DlS^'C^ OOUfT 
ROGER H. BULLOCK #485 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sears, Morde, Taylor, 
Boyd, Connell, Piper, 
Nelson and Koford 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and 
RONALD L. CARLSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., a New 
York Corporation, JAMES FARNER, 
DENNIS MORSE, BLAINE TAYLOR, 
DIANE BOYD, RICHARD CONNELL, 
THEODORE PIPER, DAN NELSON, 
ROBERT PARK, and GENE KOFORD. 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFFS• MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Judge Fc-edridc 
Defendants Sears Roebuck & Co., James Farner, Dennis 
Morse, Blaine Taylor, Diane Boyd, Richard Connell, and Gene Koford, 




1. Plaintiffs were fired from their jobs as commissioned 
sales persons at the Sears store in downtown Salt Lake City on 
September 24, 1986, for insubordination and failure to follow work 
rules. 
2. In February of 1987, plaintiffs filed this action 
against Sears and against present and former managers and fellow 
employees, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
wrongful discharge, defamation, and racketeering. 
3. In November of 1987, plaintiffs filed an action in 
United states District Court for Utah pertaining to the same 
factual claims of harassment and employment discharge which they 
also assert in the instant action, but seeking relief for alleged 
sex discrimination and age discrimination in violation of federal 
law. In August of 1990, Judge David Sam granted summary judgment 
for Sears on all claims in the United States District Court action. 
Plaintiffs1 appeal is now pending before the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
4. The instant action was dismissed by this court on 
April 22, 1991. Plaintiffs seek to revive this action by a Rule 60 
motion for relief from the dismissal. 
5. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on 
this motion and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal 
1 O O T 1 « Cm 
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absent an abuse of discretion. Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 
(Utah 1984); Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
ARGUMENT 
Under all the circumstances, the dismissal for failure to 
prosecute should stand. If the court grants plaintiffs' motion to 
set aside the order of dismissal, it should do so with respect to 
defendant Sears only, and not as to the several co-employees who 
apparently were sued out of spite. 
DATED this C? day of May, 1991 
STRONG & 
H.^BulloiF 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this { ~ day of May, 
1991, to: 
L. Zane Gill 
Attorney at Law 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
/ / / / 
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G. Notice to Submit for Decision, (dated 
September 3, 1991; filed September 5, 1991) 
(R. 232-33) 
L. Zane Gill (3716) 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-2600 
FAX: (801) 355-2606 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and RONALD L. 
CARLSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., a New 
York corporation; JAMES FARNER; 
DENNIS MORSE; BLAINE TAYLOR; 
DIANE BOYD; RICHARD CONNELL; 
THEODORE PIPER; DAN NELSON; 
ROBERT PARK and GENE KOFORD, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
Civil No. C87-1394 
Judge Frederick 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, 
and pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-
501(1)(d), hereby submit their notice to submit to the judge for 
decision their Motion to set Aside Order of Dismissal submitted 
to this court on May 3, 1991. 
DATED this 5/// day of September, 1991. 




C E R T I F I C A T E O F S E R V I C E 
I hereby certify that on the ?SKS3P> day of September, 
1991f I caused to be deposited in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION, 
to the following: 
Roger H. Bullock 
Victoria K. Kidman 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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H. Minute Entry (September 6, 1991) 
(R. 234) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHELPS, ARLENE P 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO. 






CASE NUMBER 870901394 CV 
DATE 09/06/91 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK JAB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 THE COURT 
RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS 
DENIED FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN MOVANT'S MOTION AND THE 
OBJECTION THERETO. THE APPLICATION FOR RELIEF PER RULE 60(B) 
U.R.C.P. IS INSUFFICIENT AS NO SUPPORT AFFIDAVIT IS SUBMITTED. 
2. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT'S IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
0234 
I. Order Denying Motion to Set Aside 
Dismissal (October 1, 1991) 
(R. 235-36) 
ROGER H. BULLOCK #485 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sears, Morse, Taylor 
Boyd, Connell, Piper, 
Nelson and Koford 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and ] 
RONALD L. CARLSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., a New 
York Corporation, JAMES FARNER, 
DENNIS MORSE, BLAINE TAYLOR, ] 
DIANE BOYD, RICHARD CONNELL, ] 
THEODORE PIPER, DAN NELSON, 
ROBERT PARK, and GENE KOFORD. 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
I TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL 
i Civil No. C87-1394 
i Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiffs1 motion to set aside the order of dismissal 
entered in this action on April 22, 1991, having come duly before 
the court, and the court having reviewed the pleadings and file 
materials and being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
therefore appearing, 
Third ^ u'csai 0!„inct 
OCT - 1 J99J 
By. 
1 0 1 9 3 * 02?r* 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that 




JY day of ^apfeefliSer, 1991. 
Disyriipt 
CERTIFICATE OFMAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this // day of 
September, 1991, to: 
L. Zane Gill 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
#x> 
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J. Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal (dated February 18, 1992; 
filed February 25, 1992) 
(R. 237-38) 




L. Zane Gill (3716) 
Law Office of 
L. ZANE GILL 
A Utah Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephones (801) 355-2600 
FAX: (801) 355-2606 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and 
RONALD L. CARLSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C87-1394 
Judge Frederick 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order 
Of Dismissal 
Plaintiffs move the court through their counsel for an 
order setting aside the order of dismissal signed by the court on 
April 22, 1991. This motion is made based upon Rule 60(b)(7) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4-104(4) & (5) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, and is supported by the 
accompanying affidavit and memorandum. 
0237 
DATED this (< day of February 1992. 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A  The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of 
February 1992 I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to: 
Roger H. Bullock 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 




K. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion U' ' ' \side Order of Dismissal 
46) 
L. Zane Gill lb) 
Law Office o 
L. ZANE GILL 
A Utah Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-2600 
FAX: (801) 355-2606 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 





v s „ 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND I'O ,M" all 
Defendants 
:ii/¥ i ] No C 8 7 - 1 3 9 4 
J udge Frederick 
Memorandum i.u Support Of Plai n 1::I ffs ' 
Motion To Set Aside Order Of Di sm i ssal 
The plaintiffs move the court th rough their counsel for 
a i i c :ii : ier set t::i iiiiiq a s i d e L h e o r d e r J£ di ismissal si gned by the court 
oi l Apri 3 22, ] 991. This motion is made based upoi i Rule 60(b)(7) of 
the Utah Rules of Civi 1 Procedure 
IJII (i i ill I ia a r.e* . . , ,. z 
readiness within . stt s:-jV* - rommen* < :*•• : • ' ?, dc \ : >n. R ,le 4-
103 of the Code wi ww.jioiui xtUnuLnxsLi.aL.Lwii - Operation ui uue 
0-'' » 
C o u r t s - a l l u w i 1 ln> i I i Ii ii i i i I i I s i < n I i lui idd* 
m a n a g e m e n t Lu d i s m i b t r " w i t h o u t p r e itidi.oo l o r ii.ict oi : 
p r o s e c u t i o n i f a c e r t i f i c a t e of r e a d i n e s s h a s not boen s e r v e d and 
f l ] ed w i t h i r i i y I I 1 " miiiu• r• i PHI f 1 ' "u "• , • Th * 
a u t h o i i L y J.I s u b j e c t i n a d e i e n s e of good c a u s e , i i p e c i i i c a I J y, 
R u l e '1 J 041- I l l ' s | r e s t r i c t s ii p a r t y from f i 1 i ng a c e r t i f i c a t e of 
r e a d i n e s s f o r t r i a l m IM.HO* in uihn Ii i I i-soui'i «r\ II not i umpli'M 
pi" i or I II I i J n ig Lhe c e r t i f i c a t e , 
R u l e 6 0 I J . . wv-i r e l i e i from idun - i t s OJ o r d e i S wherp 
c l e r i c a l m i s t a k e 0 " i mi IVPI H I qht MI 
oii i iss i t , in di,o nuifb -. * ~r w ^ ivideH I oi r e l i e i 
from a j u d g m e n t ' ) r a e r * : *.? «-veni i n i t - t a k e , i n a d v e r t e n c i > 
s u r p r i s e o.r e x c u s e - v . . . ' i , IUIIM 11111 I i | | | 
p r o v i d e s lo i M\J M^nv nt , O J S .* j u s t i f y i n q i r e l i n l 
f rom t h e o p e r a t i o n * * ~* judgmen t a s e a oon the? t u l l o w i n q 
d i s c u s s i o n , t h e o i d b i u i a i s m i s s a i xn units «** in ml I lu ni 
a s i d e . 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Tin1, t\,is< I1. h.soly rolatPd 1.. .i parallel lederall action 
wit); the same heading which is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit 
Court:. - Appeal , This action states causes of action fur state 
C O m - U K I O I i r i l I " i l l II Il I I I I i > l l l | | | | I I  | . J | H I [ 1 1 1 1 | M i l l Il II I  IN " 
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p I a i nt i f 1:M ( i I nil I h o i i i "iii|)I i »y mi- ml ill Sea t i i Roeb i ie t h Company i n S a l t 
Ldke C i t y , I J t an . v'oi y l i t t l e 1 was d o n r undi r t h i s s t a t e a c t i on 
w h i l e t h e f e d e r a l a c t i o r !| < b o i n q 1 > t i q a t o d . O r d e r s i n !::: 1: i£ 
f e d p i i i l i • 1 mi 11 I MI I I  nwon I doipobi l imii, h ik im i mi C I M I I M a d i on La b e u s e d 
iii I hti t e d e i d l c a s e . The p a r a l l e l f e d e r a l c a s e was a g g r e s s i v e l y 
l i t i g a t e d and p r e p a r e d f o r t r i a l . I'lic H o n o r a b l e J u d g e Sam g r a n t e d 
I.In1 iii "f enddii l • mi mi in ill iiiHiiiii I in ' iiiiiuiiii y luilqmiMil IIMIQIIKJ i.lie p l d i n t i f f s 
t o a p p e a l , t h a t d e c i s i o n i.o i h e T e n t h C i r c u i t C o u r t of A p p e a l s w h e r e 
i t , i.s now p e n d i n g , , 
(In ( M P I M ' T IU , | , | , l l l l l - M I I V . H h 'I.** I I r i i i i t i f i f a MI-veil i h e 
c o u r t t o r a s c h e d u l i n g and utdnagement c o n f e r e n c e , p u r s u a n t Lo R u l e 
l t i ( b ) of t h e U t a h R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , AI t h a t l-imr, r o u n s e l 
r e q u e s t e d <i i ; r hodu 1 i IIIII iiiil iiiiiiiiianoiiiioiil i i m l c n in v IIII i m di MI III s e l 
Liine l i n e s l o r Lhc c o m p l e t i o n of any o u t s t a n d i n g d i s c o v e r y , t h e 
f i l i n g and h e a r i n g of m o t i o n s , the* p o s s i b i l i t y of f a c i 1 i * ^t.Miq < 
s e t t lemon 1 mil I in in III 111 I 11 i i i i r i l tc i 1 i iiiii \ i in 11 in I In 
di.upoi.1 L L ion >f i he c a s t ; . By iiii nuLe e n t i ' y da t < si O c t o b e r M , 1 990 , 
t h e c o u r t d e n i e d t h e p l a i n t i f f s 1 n o t i o n foi «i s c h e d u ] m q and 
m a n a g e m e n t c o n f e r e n c e * Tho n m i l i ml i o ml oil ,il pi MI 1 IIII MI I I • 
\ mi mi in 111 mi in l e c e i p t o l a c e r t i f i caL icjn of r e a d i n o s s fnj 
t r i a l • 
C o u n s e 1, £ o r t h e p 1 a i n 1 i f f f actiso< 1 up< 11 \11:ej:,»;,i i• a t 11,»11 « I 1 I;i<i» 
b r J e f in in | MI I Iiiii" TV MI I I Hi C i r c u i t A p p e a l and no f u r t h e r d i s c o v e r y was 
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conducted until rift or n v r M v i u it M ilt.-r in show caure I ft tin's 
act inn I K H L J JuihiUitiY ">
 t l1*1*' At Hie hearing held on February 22, 
139 i counsel for plaint i I fs represented ! o i hi vm, I h ml I 
believed hv cntild have the • ISM t>L«a<h .a certification m 4S days 
ii* t'v in11! i "ij itiei discovery was necessary'. In reviewing the 
files, pursuant to that representation, roup sol li » tin, j iaii.1 i ( I 6 
noticed IIM 1 several items " " "sri "• I , I iiad previously been 
request i laeeiai act ion and kturti ^ere pertinent in ihe 
issiujb In the state action had not been provided n " 'IM U1" t«i„„,i,i, ,is. 
Accordingly, counsel tor plaini i I t « ) irwj .u eii m u served pldintiffs' 
first se » iih'j tuyaLoiios and request for production of 
documents t.u the defendants to cover unanswered rem.est i i. "lie 
federal case and certain now i • nm.s peiLi-em t.ruj preparation for 
tri.il " • i1,,!! I MI I nose discovery requests were served on the 
defendants tin March 29 • \ certificate of service «s " iled 
on the same? date. 
I'M, ii" tljiM '« i .*;eipt of the ordei of di siiiissu i
 r A p r i l 
'"ii", I y !f I
 f plaintiffs had heard no responses from the def one! ml •-• *MM 
way or the other, 'I'IIH ordf *- * diM(«ii 1 n. leceived ax days 
before the explicit io I I he response time on I he plaintiffs * first 
sel o.t interrogatories and request for production oi document!, in 
the defendants. 
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ARGUMl'IM'l" 
1 . i n c o m p l e t e D i s c o v e r y C o n s t i t u t e s Good Cause 
P l a i n t d f t s nad qood can so tot not fi l i irni a r n r t i f i ca f v i 
r e a d i n e s s , llliiii I Il III I i 11 i Il I he ironic ill J u J j L i a l Admi l u s t r a t i o n 
p r o v i d e s that , any c e r t i f i c a t e oi r e a d i n e s s toi t r i a l In a c a s e in 
which t h e d i s c o v e r y i s n o t comple t e p r i o r In f i " inq t h e c e r t i f i c a l i 1 
may be s t r i c k e n . Rpr •< \<\ti i i i m | ihi lm I mil m I di t t ha t c e r t a i n 
' l o o s e ends needed t o be t i e d down b e f o r e I.ho c a s e was ready for 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n for t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f s ' counse l t i m e l y s e r v e d upon 
defendant r d i "icovm / nim)d»«d i i in i IM | Mm i
 ti i> in L'ompietLon tut 
t r i a l rlu .in1 i s l e a d y for t r i a l o t h e r thttn t h e s e l o o s e ends 
which a r e pend ing r e s o l u t i o n . There have been numerous d e p o s i t i o n s 
t a k e n which w i l l ho mi ion iiiiiii i III1 . t.al » i inn i u:i MJII ilipre 
I in u;< 'ti LJI documents Ltiat tiie p e r t i n e n t t o t h e s t a t e c o u r t l i t i g a t i o n 
Mill 11 h were* deve loped f o r u se in both t h e f e d e r a l and s t a t r r d&>u& 
ii in ' i l h c r thr i" o b t a i n inq respon*- *ir ' * ' "M1 '< • " i | 11» I mj > 11 " 'overy 
i Hqdi.sLs HI hu p l a i n t i f f s , t h e c a s e J S i eady for a s s i g n m e n t ot ii 
t r i a l d a t e . 
T h e r e f o r e , niuod IMI.I.S " o x i s i i. n i in i m i i K i i i i i I 111,1 I i i » 
prevenl. Uie i in o i u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l w i t h o u t [p re jud ice o t t h i s a c t i o n 
fo r l ack of p r o s e c u t i o n . P l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n s e l s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
compl ied w i t h t h e o r d e r of t h e coin:! , |., ti n->ciiif • "ho - rdo", ii, di -
 u / 
\" d u s c d a t e d I'V.bruai y '; I " " I *!" I I mil', a f f i r m a t i v e s t e p s t o f i n a l l y 
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p r e p a i e I In- M M . * Il i ill, i i it I . 
II- Under URCP 60(b)(7), Plaintiffs Are Entitled To Relief From 
The Order Of Dismissal 
Rule 60(b)( 7) provi des for rel i ef based on "a ny other reason 
words, relief should be granted where there is good cause,1 
Incomplete discovery constitutes good cause, 
II I n I ' V d t t .in 1 II u II i In HI i| II i I mi in II n i t in -i I i < 1 i m l in i i in I II I l l I i i I I I " . II m i 
g e n e r a l , t h e a p p l i c a n t : I or r e l i e t roust show t h a t she a c t e d w i t h 
t f.visonabl e p r o m p t n e s s , that shi* hat> n <' I a i in o r d e f e n s e of 
t i i iDJi ii ( t i n J ii 1 mi in mi mi mi I in i mi I i n mi i i s s o r i x n i l i l l I i n i m i i j i n i Mill nil. i n O t 
a s i d e , t h a t g r a n t i n g t h e mot ion WJ ] 1 mint u n f a i r l y j e o p a r d i z e 
i n t e r e s t s of r e l i a n c e t h a t have ,*• > *>hape on t h e b a s i s nf t h e 
111r 1 r|inr^ FIt , nidi t hut t hm fir'mifiri«- T H w i n nnt t hninnp I vrss 
p j e v i o u . - i y avj :uaj c a t e c . r i q u i d i dcLinn , HdZdiill, I i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e 676 (1985K * . • iiider M'nlo b i s made 
i 'i HI id i I mm; M I ill M n r e 
havL. D e e n , n - . . , t. . : ,t , .unaJ del~.au It Is g r a n t e d a l m o s t 
I -nurse under "!< *visio~ , 60(h) (III) ( j o v e m i n ; " e x c u s a b l e 
neglect . * ' • i ini'. I 1111II i fis-iv iin" I "M I,
 p msi? im! h e r 
. Good cause: s^rantiai reason, one that affords a legal 
excuse. Legally sufficient ground or reason I Black's Law 
Dictionary 5th Edition (1979). 
6 
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I han excusab le i i><|li 1 i i i m m ml, I h e r u i o r e , P l a i n t i f f s ' r e q u e s t 
lui l e i x e i s h o u l d be g r a n t e d . 
I t i s o r d i n a r i l y an abusp wt . i i n c r r t i mi I., i e f i r . e in iMdil . mi 
d e f a u l l iiini"|iiiiMil whiM" Uion« i«, i edbviiaij I t: jm, L i t i c a t i o n <T excuse 
I i L iL lure t o appear and t i m e l y a p p l i c a t i o n *s made t*» set it. 
a s i d e C e n t r a l F i n a n c e Co. v . Kynas ton , «J > '" "" /-i » i '« |>»' '« | 
Wh i l o t h e f r I a i 'nut I »11* l« woo w i i b cons J d e r a b l e l a t i t u d e or. 
d i s c r e t i o n in g r a n t i/uj in deny ing mot ions to s e t a s i d e d e f a u l t 
judgments , it. cannot a r t a r b i t r a r i l y I MII ihl h i| 'IUM.II I V" 
i n d u l a e n t towiinl niTfinll IIIII I i l l i n q u i r y and knuwJedyt; oi d i s p u t e s 
in lli«t. they can be s e t t l e d a d v i s e d l y arid in c o n f o r m i t y . " ' ' I avv 
and j u s t i c e . Mayhew v . S t a n d a r d G i l s o n i t e _CCIK 
1962) , 
I ' M I I I M " , c o u r t s s h o u l d be l i b e r a l i"i q r a n t i n g r e l i e f a g a i n s t 
judgments t a k e n by d e f a u l t ""|w|,* a r e in accord g e n e r a l 1y 'OHH 
d o c t r i n e urged by l^ppl ' ' *,llllll* I ' h " " 'i*1 < < MI I i. • iiouJii t»» i i t j e ra i in 
gj iiiii, J iiiii tel'iH'i a g a i n s t judgments t aken by def>uilt in t h e nnd t"hat 
c o n t r o v e r s i e s may be t r i e d on 1 he m e r i t s . " S t a t e By h rhrouuh v. ui 
S , S . v . . Musselma 11
 f f \ 6 7 V M III" i I i III 1111 I' J III I) c i t i n g Mason v . M a s o n , 
5.(l .' I .1 I 1 "\"' , I \J i ( U t a h l'J n \ 
CONCLUSION 
Bas»io | ii i i it".' L o r e g o i n g , p l a i ntiffs respectful 1 y move 
7 
n24r» 
the court to set asi de i ts order of dismi ssa ] without rrejudice and 
a ] ] :: i n the ca se t :: • be se I: f :: -r tri a ] after an j :: u tst< MI " i » 
objections are fi led by defendants and resolved and/or defendants 
'have provided the informati > 
c:i 1 sec:) v ery req ties ts of Ma rcl |« 
DATED t h i s 
- tes ted by t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n t h e 
• 1 
i'ebr u a r y 1 992 , 
ZMIE GILL, P . C . 
-/y? = ' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The u n d e r s i g n e d 1 lereby c e r t i f i e s t h a t on t h e 
V^-T 
day of 
F ebruary 1992 I caused to be ma :i led, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct' copy «»f the foregoing to: 
Roger H. Bullock 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
i: II H'liAP bOh.iiM'l 
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{]j 'ff; 
Affidavit o e Gill 
^ 1 V , ^ T / "V 
L. Zane Gill (3716) 
Law Office of 
L. ZANE GILL 
A Utah Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-2600 
FAX: (801) 355-2606 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and 
RONALD L. CARLSON, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al, ; 
Defendants. 
) Civil No. C87-1394 
1 Judge Frederick 
Affidavit of L. Zane Gill 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
I, L. Zane Gill, having been duly sworn, state as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs had good cause for not filing a certificate of 
readiness within 180 days of commencement of the action as 
discovery was not yet complete. 




 n \ 
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2. This case is closely related to a parallel federal action 
with the same heading which is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, 
3. This action states causes of action for state common law 
claims related to the wrongful termination of the plaintiffs from 
their employment at Sears Roebuck & Company in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
4. Very little was done under this state action while the 
federal action was being litigated. 
5. Orders in the federal court allowed depositions taken in 
either action to be used in the federal case. 
6. The parallel federal case was aggressively litigated and 
prepared for trial. 
7. The Honorable Judge Sam granted the defendants' motions 
for summary judgment leading the plaintiffs to appeal that decision 
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals where it is now pending. 
8. On October 5f 1990, counsel for the plaintiffs moved the 
court for a scheduling and management conference, pursuant to Rule 
16(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
9. On October 5, 1990, counsel requested a scheduling and 
management conference in order to set time lines for the completion 
of any outstanding discovery, the filing and hearing of motions, 
the possibility of facilitating a settlement, and for such other 
2 
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matters as may aid in the disposition of the case. 
10. By minute entry dated October 11, 1990, the court denied 
the plaintiffs' motion for a scheduling and management conference. 
11. The court indicated that pertinent dates would be set 
upon receipt of a certification of readiness for trial. 
12. Counsel for the plaintiff focused upon preparation of the 
briefing in the Tenth Circuit Appeal and no further discovery was 
conducted until after receiving an order to show cause in this 
action dated February 5, 1991. 
13. At the hearing held on February 22, 1991, counsel for 
plaintiffs represented to the court that he believed he could have 
the case ready for certification in 45 days in the event no further 
discovery was necessary. 
14. In reviewing the files, pursuant to that representation, 
counsel for the plaintiffs noticed that several items of discovery 
which had previously been requested in the federal action and which 
were pertinent to the issues in the state action had not been 
provided by the defendants. 
15. Accordingly, counsel for plaintiffs prepared and served 
plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and request for production 
of documents to the defendants to cover unanswered requests from 
the federal case and certain new items pertinent to the preparation 
3 
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for trial in this matter. 
16. Those discovery requests were served on the defendants on 
March 29, 1991. 
17. A certificate of service was filed on the same date. 
18. By the date of receipt of the order of dismissal, April 
26, 1991, plaintiffs had heard no response from the defendants one 
way or the other. 
19. The order of dismissal was received six days before the 
expiration of the response time on the plaintiffs' first set of 
interrogatories and request for production of documents to the 
defendants. 
DATED this i? ^ day of February 1992. 
L. ZANSLGILL, P.C. 





' NOTARY PUBLIC 
Resides in Salt Lake City 
My Commission Expires: 
uEANNAV M >^ 
-15 South Gtato n 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
 a 
My Commission Expires B 
December 3,19§5 I 
State of Jtah J. 
0250 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 ,^t The undersigned hereby certifies that on the /0 day of 
February 1992 I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
orrect copy of the foregoing to: 
Roger H. Bullock 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 




M. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order 
of Dismissal (March 2, 1992) 
(R. 252-55) 
ROGER H. BULLOCK, #0485 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and 
RONALD L. CARLSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., 
Defendants. 
et al., 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER 
I OF DISMISSAL 
i Civil No. C87-1394 
i Judge Frederick 
Defendants, through counsel, submit the following memorandum 
in opposition to plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal dated February 18, 1992. 
FACTS 
1. This court had ordered this action dismissed for 
failure to prosecute on April 22, 1991. 
2. On May 3, 1991, plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside 
the order of dismissal, urging that Rule 60(b) provides for 
relief from a judgment or order in the event of mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. [This specific 
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3. This court denied plaintiffs1 motion to set aside the 
order of dismissal by minute entry dated September 6, 1991, and 
by written order entered shortly thereafter. 
4. Plaintiffs have now filed a second Rule 60(b) motion 
dated February 18, 1992, making essentially the same arguments 
they made in May of 1991. However, plaintiffs characterize their 
motion as a motion under Rule 60(b)(7) for relief based on "any 




THIS MOTION IS FILED TOO LATE, RULE 60(b)(1) 
MOTIONS MUST BE FILED WITHIN THREE MONTHS, 
AND PLAINTIFFS CANNOT AVOID THAT RULE BY 
MISCHARACTERIZING THE MOTION AS BASED ON "ANY 
OTHER REASON" UNDER RULE 60(b)(7). 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is mandatory that 
motions for relief from a judgment or order on the ground of 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, enumerated 
under (b)(1) of the rule, must be made within not more than three 
months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or 
taken. This motion comes ten months after the order of dismissal 
for failure to prosecute. Plaintiffs filed essentially the same 
motion in May of 1991, which the court denied in September, 1991. 
Even if the current motion is viewed as a motion for relief from 
201628nh 2 
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the order of September, 1991, the current motion is barred by the 
three-month time requirement. 
Subdivision (b)(7) may not be used to circumvent the three-
month filing period where the basis for the relief from judgment 
is based on grounds within the scope of Subdivision (b)(1). 
Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977); Calder Bros. Co. v. 
Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982); Gardiner and Gardiner Bldrs. 
v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 
1193 (Utah 1984); Larsen v. Collina 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
POINT II. 
THE RULES DO NOT PROVIDE FOR SUCCESSIVE RULE 
60 MOTIONS. 
There is no provision in Rule 60 for separate, successive 
motions on essentially the same grounds. To allow this motion 
would allow plaintiffs the luxury of refiling their motion for 
reconsideration as many times as necessary until they might 
persuade the court. 
POINT III. 
IN ANY EVENT, THIS MOTION WAS NOT MADE WITHIN 
A REASONABLE TIME. 
Even assuming that this motion is not barred because of the 
three-month time requirement, and assuming that the standard 
should be the requirement that the motion be made within a 
reasonable time, plaintiffs have offered no explanation about why 
it has taken them ten months to file this motion following the 
201628nh 3 
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court's order of dismissal. In Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Century 
Cas. Co -, 621 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1980), the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed a denial of Rule 60 relief where there was no showing of 
reasons for delay in seeking relief for 115 days after the order 
complained of. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, plaintiffs1 current motion to set 
aside order of dismissal should be denied. 




Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was hand delivered this & n day of 
. 1992, to: 
L. Zane Gill 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
KjldL^ 
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N. Minute Entry (May 13, 1992) 
(R. 256) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHELPS, ARLENE P 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO. 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 870901394 CV 
DATE 05/13/92 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 




AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND REQUEST FOR HEARING DATED 
MAY 8, 1992, THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS 
DENIED FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE THERETO. 
2. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS DENIED. 
3. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS IS TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE 
ORDER. 
0256 
O. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Set 
Aside Order of Dismissal (May 28, 1992) 
(R. 259-60) 
ROGER H. BULLOCK, #0485 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
FilEOmSTmeT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 8 1992 
A SALUAKECOWY 
By U^jQ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and 
RONALD L. CARLSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C87-1394 
Judge Frederick 
Plaintiffs1 motion dated February 18, 1992, to set 
aside the order of dismissal in this action having come duly 
before the court, Hon. J. Dennis Frederick presiding, and the 
court having reviewed the record and file materials, including 
the memorandum and affidavit in support of the motion and 
defendants1 memorandum in opposition, and the court finding that 
a hearing is not required pursuant to Rule 4-501(3), Code of 
Judicial Administration, and the court being fully advised in the 





NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs1 request for oral argument is denied and plaintiffs1 
motion dated February 18, 1992, to set aside order of dismissal 
be and is denied. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this Jy^ day of 
May, 1992, to: 
L. Zane Gill 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Aw^M/w 
3/10WJ47 
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P. Notice of Appeal (dated June 22, 1992; 




L. Zane Gill (3716) 
Law Office of 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
215 South State, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-2600 
FAX: (801) 355-2606 
JUN?4 9 25AH'fc 
run. 
. U i ' T R l C T 
BY 
SAL 1 t - • vflUNTY. 
J _ _ \ _ _ _ 
in i i l { CLERK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE P. PHELPS and 
RONALD L. CARLSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al, ) 
Defendants. ' 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. C87-1394 
i Judge Frederick 
± 
Notice is hereby given that Arlene P. Phelps and Ronald 
L. Carlson, above-named plaintiffsf do hereby appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court from judgment entered May 28, 1992 denying 
plaintiffs' motion to set aside order of dismissal and request for 
oral argument. 
DATED this JZ^ day of June 1992. 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
0261 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
M. * / I hereby certify that on the JL9 day of June 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
026Z 
